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Comment
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a
Heavyweight
Neal Devins*
The affirmative action wars continue. 1 In Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC, 2 the Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, upheld Federal Communications Commission (FCC) efforts to increase minority ownership and participation in broadcast management through race preferences in the
granting of licenses. 3 In the wake of the 1988 Term's City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co. 4 decision, the first case in which a majority of Justices
formally endorsed strict scrutiny review in an affirmative action case, 5
expectations had been high that Metro Broadcasting would invalidate the
FCC program by extending Croson to federal race preference programs. 6
Metro Broadcasting is surprising for other reasons. After the 1988
• Associate Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William and Mary. A.B.
1978, Georgetown University; J.D. 1982, Vanderbilt Law School. A snmmer research grant from
the Marshall-Wythe School of Law snpported the work on this Comment. Thanks to Mike
Gerhardt for commenting on an earlier draft.
1. This sentence plays off of Herman Schwartz's snggestion that the "affirmative action wars
are over." Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Afftnnative Action Cases: It's All Over but the Shouting, 86
MICH. L. REv. 524, 524 (1987). In an essay pnblished in this review last year, I disputed Schwartz's
suggestion. See Devins, Afftnnative Action After Reagan, 68 TEXAS L. REv. 353, 378 (1989)
("Miewed as a mosaic, the cases leave unanswered many questions about the scope of permissible
affirmative action.").
2. 110 s. Ct. 2997 (1990).
3. Id. at 3009.
4. 109 s. Ct. 706 (1989).
5. See id. at 721.
6. Analysis of the Court's failnre to extend Croson has focused on Justice White. White, who
endorsed strict review in Croson, refused to extend Croson to federal action, thereby providing the
critical fifth vote in Metro Broadcasting. Althongh White did not file an opinion in either case, and
the explanations for his apparent flip-flop are somewhat conjectural, the best explanation is that
White has a tendency to support federal action. As one former law clerk explained: "[W)ith White
'one of the constants is respect for federal power or federal anthority. You can usually fill him in on
the side of the federal government.'" Stewart, White to the Right?, A.B.A. J., July 1990, at 40, 42.
This sentiment was echoed by former Solicitor General Charles Fried, who noted that "Congress
looms very large in White's jnrisprudence" and that "[h]e almost seems to yearn for a parliamentary
democracy.'' Lewis, Court Ruling Encourages Affirmative Action, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1990, at 12,
col. 5. White's pivotal role in recent cases led former Reagan official Charles Cooper to remark:
" 'The story of the [1989] term was Justice White. He's the Supreme Conrt.' " Marcus, Supreme
Court Liberals Savor Wins Amid Conservative Majority, Wash. Post, July 2, 1990, at AS, col. 6
(quoting Cooper).

125
HeinOnline -- 69 Tex. L. Rev. 125 1990-1991

Texas Law Review

Vol. 69:125, 1990

Term, there was reason to think that a firm, conservative majority dominated the Court. Rulings on privacy, employment discrimination, affirmative action, and the death penalty signalled the solidification of a
Reagan-appointee-driven Court. 7 Indeed, popu1ar and scholarly commentary heralded "the end of an era of judicial activism that had lasted
four decades and profoundly transformed the structure of American government and society." 8 Metro Broadcasting demonstrates, however, that
claims of the ascendancy of a new Supreme Court era are premature.
Along with other 5-4 rulings on privacy, political patronage, and school
desegregation remedies, 9 the decision reveals that the Rehnquist Court is
one vote shy of a solidified majority.
The real surprise of Metro Broadcasting, however, is not its outcome. Prior cases amply supported the federal government's use of race
to remedy societal discrimination. 10 Accordingly, the FCC and the
United States Senate, in briefs filed before the Court, characterized the
preference as a congressionally mandated remedy. 11 The Court did not
7. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2980 (1989) (holding that capital punishment for crimes committed when the defendant was 16 or 17 years old is not cruel or unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115,
2121-23 (1989) (holding that a statistical concentration of nonwhite workers in unskilled positions
and of white workers in skilled positions did not establish a prima facie case of disparate impact
under Title VII requiring the employer to justify its hiring practice); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1391-96 (1989) (holding that because Customs Service employees applying for promotion to sensitive positions have a diminished expectation of privacy, suspicionless drug testing of these employees did not violate the Fourth Amendment); City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 730 (1989) (striking down a city plan requiring prime contractors
who received city construction contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the contract to minority
businesses). For overviews of the 1988 Term, see Coyle, The Supreme Court Review: Overview,
NAT'L LJ., Aug. 21, 1989, at S2; The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Leading Cases, 103 HARv. L.
REv. 40 (1989); Greenhouse, The Year the Court Turned Right, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1989, at AI,
col. 2; and Savage & Lauter, Court Backs Government Against Citizen: Rehnquist Gavels an End to
Era of Judicial Activism, L.A. Times, Jnly 7, 1989, pt. 1, at 1, coL 1.
8. Savage & Lauter, supra note 7; see also Supremely Surly, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1989, § 4, at
26, col. 1 (observing that "[s]uddenly but predictably, the Reagan appointees to the Supreme Court
have taken control''); Greenhouse, supra note 7 (concluding that "[f]or the first time in a generation,
a conservative majority was in a position to control the outcome on most important issues").
9. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of lll., 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2737 (1990) (preventing promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring decisions involving low-level public employees from being based
upon party affiliation and support); Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 1688-90 (1990) (5-2-2
decision) (guaranteeing overnight guests a fourth-amendment right to privacy in other people's
homes that protects them from warrantless searches); Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1665
(1990) (allowing, as a last resort, judges to order local or state officials to raise taxes to pay for a
valid desegregation decree). For overviews of the 1989 Term, see Marcus, supra note 6; Greenhouse,
A Divided Supreme Court Ends the Term with a Bang, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1990, § 4, at 3, col. 1; and
Savage, High Court Puts its Faith in 'Laboratory of the States,' L.A. Times, July 1, 1990, at AI, col.
5.
10. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476-78 (1980) (upholding a remedial set-aside
enacted by Congress); Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 717-20 (discussing and distinguishing Fullilove from setasides enacted by state and local government).
11. Brief of the U.S. Senate as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453) ("The interest of the Senate in this case is
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dispute this contention. It pointed to congressional findings of " 'inequities stemming from racial and ethnic discrimination' " 12 serving as a basis for the FCC preferences. A route was open to the Court to uphold
the FCC program by simply reaffirming and slightly extending existing
precedent.
The Court did not travel this paved road. Instead, it elected to
make the focus of its inquiry the nonremedial objective of promoting program diversity through increasing minority ownership. In approving the
FCC preference as a diversity measure, the Court chose the broadest
grounds available for federal race preferences. Moreover, rather than
make use of the compelling interest and least restrictive means test typically associated with racial line drawing (including, after Croson, affirmative action), the Court ruled that "benign" 13 preferences mandated by
Congress need only be "substantially related" to "important governmental objectives within the power of Congress." 14 Finally, in finding congressional approval of the FCC preference, the Court relied on various
sources of statutory construction-legislative inaction, appropriation riders, and action on related legislation15-that had come under sharp attack by the conservative wing of the Court. 16 Indeed, in the 1988 Term
decisions limiting the sweep of civil rights protections, the Court had
explicitly rejected some of these interpretive toolsP
Metro Broadcasting is a significant expansion of affirmative action
and is more than surprising at this point in the Court's evolution. At the
grounded in the conviction that the legislation [that] Congress has enacted to require the continuation of the FCC's policy is a measured and constitutional effort to overcome past inequities and to
advance the legitimate public interest in diversity of programming.") (emphasis added); Brief for
Federal Communications Commission at 16, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997
(1990) (No. 89-453) ("The minority enhancement policy is a race-conscious measure that has been
ordered by Congress •..."); id. at 17 ("The minority enhancement and other statutory policies that
seek to further minority ownership of broadcast stations should also be viewed as an effort by Congress to remedy the effects of past discrimination.") (emphasis added).
12. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3009-10 (1990) (quoting H.R. CoNF.
REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 43, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2261,
2287).
13. /d. at 3008.
14. /d. at 3009.
15. See id. at 3013-16.
16. See Fein, Scalia's Way, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1990, at 38, 38; Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE LJ. 511, 514.
17. For example, in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363,2372 (1989), the Court
placed no weight on Congress's failure to overturn the Supreme Court's expansive reading of 42
U.S.C. § 1981 in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). The Court declared: "It is 'impossible
to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents' affirmative congressional approval of the Court's statutory interpretation." Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372 n.1 (quoting Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671-72 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). By contrast, in
giving broad approval to voluntary affirmative action in 1987, the Court found Congress's refusal to
overturn a related 1979 decision controlling. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 627-29
& nn.1-2 (1987).
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beginning of the 1989 Term, it seemed impossible that a majority of Justices would subscribe to such a far-reaching decision. 18 Indeed, Metro
Broadcasting's monumental character may doom its prospects for lasting
precedential influence. The replacement of William Brennan with David
Souter portends either an extremely narrow reading of Metro Broadcasting or its outright reversal.I9
In a strange way, this state of affairs makes the case especially significant. Metro Broadcasting may prove to be a sign post, the final
landmark of a period when individuals like William Brennan helped lead
the Court. The ca8e is already being labeled as one of Brennan's most
significant opinions. 20 Metro Broadcasting exemplifies Brennan's ability
to build coalitions that sacrifice doctrinal purity to achieve the desired
outcome.21
This Comment, I hope, will resist the impulse to feign nostalgia.
18. The unexpectedness of the Court's pronouncements was evident in conservatives' reactions
to the opinion: Judge Robert Bork called it "terrible," One on One with John McLaughlin (Federal

Information Systems Corp. broadcast, July 6, 1990) (NEXIS, Nexis library, current file); former
Reagan civil rights head William Bradford Reynolds and conservative commentator Bruce Fein
labeled the decision the Term's "worst ruling." Fein & Reynolds, High Court Closes Door on Mixed
Session, Legal Times, July 9, 1990, at 18, col. 1; and Charles Fried, Reagan's Solicitor General,
called the decision a "homole thing." Lewis, supra note 6. By contrast, liberals were exhilarated.
Andrew Schwartzman of the Media Access Project exclaimed that the decision "exceeded our
wildest expectations." Marcus, Supreme Court Upholds FCC Minority Preference, Wash. Post, June
28, 1990, at AI, col. 6.
19. Souter's views on the constitutionality of affl11Ilative action are unknown, although some
years ago he argued that government "'should not be involved in this.'" Fulwood, Don't Quiz
Souter, Thornburg Warns Senators, L.A. Times, July 26, 1990, at A20, col. 1 (quoting address by
David Souter, New England Aeronautical Institute and Daniel Webster College Commencement
Ceremony (May 30, 1976)). At the same time, most observers perceive that decisions like Metro
Broadcasting "appear unlikely to survive on a Court without Brennan." Marcus, New Justice Likely
to Tilt Court's Balance of Power, Wash. Post, July 29, 1990, at AlO, col. 1. Souter's confl11Ilation
hearings shed little light on this matter. See Marcus, Senators Left Wondering After Hearings:
Which Is the Real David Souter?, Wash. Post, Sept. 23, 1990, at A4, col.l. Equal rights groups,
however, perceive Souter as unreliable on affl11Ilative action. The NAACP, for example, opposed
Souter for this reason. See NAACP Says It Will Oppose Souter Nomination to Court, Wash. Post,
Sept. 23, 1990, at AS, col.S.
20. See, e.g., Coyle, A Final Victory Marks the End of a Career, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13, 1990, at
S4, col. 2 (noting that Metro Broadcasting reflects Breunan's "consummate skill and brilliance in
fine-tuning decisions in such a way that the essential fifth voter either sigued on to or wrote the
majority opinion"); Marcus, Supreme Court Liberals Savor Wins Amid Conservative Majority, Wash.
Post, July 2, 1990, at AS, col. 1 (characterizing Metro Broadcasting as "the most unexpected win of
all for Brennan" of the 1989 Term).
21. The crafting of "analytically indefensible" opinions that garner a five-Justice majority is a
Breunan trademark. Tushnet, The Optimist's Tale, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 12S7, 1263 (1984). As
Professor Mark Tushnet observed in his analysis of Plyler v. Doe, 4S7 U.S. 202 (1982): "[The opinion's] very awkwardness reveals much about what Justice Brennan really was doing: not writing a
carefully crafted opinion, not being profound, but building a coalition.'' Tushnet, supra.
In Metro Broadcasting, it appears that two critical features of the Court's analysis are attributable to Justice Brennan's efforts to have Justice White provide the critical fifth vote. First, Metro
Broadcasting is limited to congressionally mandated race preferences. See infra note 88 and accompanying text. This reflects Justice White's view of judicial deference to acts of Congress. See supra
note 6. Second, the framing of the FCC program as a nonremedial diversity preference may be
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While the changing composition of the Court cannot be ignored, Metro
Broadcasting-momentarily at least-governs the constitutionality of
federal affirmative action efforts and hence demands serious scrutiny.
This Comment will evaluate the three critical features of the casenamely, the utilization of middle tier rather than strict scrutiny review,
the depiction of the FCC preference as a congressional program, and the
focus on diversity rather than remedial justifications. I will take issue
with each of these features. First, in all race cases, strict scrutiny is the
appropriate standard of review. 22 Granted, congressional authority to
take race into account both expands the range of permissible federal ac~
tion in this area and warrants deference to legislative determinations of a
means~ends nexus. Yet without strict review, the principle disfavoring
racial classifications is subverted. Second, the FCC preference cannot be
fairly described as a congressional program. 23 FCC preferences are
rooted in judicial edict and presidential initiative. While congressional
action furthers the FCC preference, Congress never authorized the FCC
program. Third, first~amendment diversity is an inadequate justification
for the FCC preference.24 Preferences rooted solely in diversity, while
advancing first~amendment values, undermine the universalistic prohibi~
tion of line drawing on the basis of race. When this core equal protection
value comes into conflict with discretionary governmental programs that
serve the First Amendment, the First Amendment must give way.
Though the above synopsis reveals my strong disapproval of Metro
Broadcasting, I do not suggest that either Congress or the FCC is with~
out power in this area. In my view, either Congress's fourteenth~amend~
ment section 5 power25 or the FCC's broad congressionally delegated
rule~making power26 could furnish the formal foundation for the diver~
sity rule as a remedy for discrimination that inhibits minority ownership
of television and radio stations. A close look at the FCC preference
reveals it to be as much a remedial measure as a diversity measure. 27 In
attributable to Justice White's comments at oral argument, that Congress never endorsed the FCC
preferences as a remedial device. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text
23. See infra notes 77-113 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 114-64 and accompanying text.
25. The Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 5. For scholarly treatments of the
reach of this power, see Choper, Congressional Power to Expand Judicial Definitions of the Substantive Terms of the Civil War Amendments, 61 MINN. L. REv. 299 (1982); and Cox, Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion ofHuman Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91 (1966). See also infra notes
135-39 and accompanying text.
26. See 47 U.S. C. § 154(i) (1982) (giving the FCC the power to "make such rules and regulations •.. as may be necessary in the execution of its functions").
27. See infra notes 165-90 and accompanying text
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fact, there is reason to suspect that the preference is primarily a remedial
measure clothed in the garb of diversity. 2 s
At the same time, a more forthright remedial justification for the
program by Congress or the FCC is necessary. While either Congress or
the FCC is empowered to remedy discrimination by way of race preferences, race-conscious remedies must be justified as remedies. Having the
ball returned to Congress and the FCC is important both symbolically
and practically. The government's use of race is serious business and
hence it is not mere formalism to demand that proper procedure be
followed.
I.

The Metro Broadcasting Opinion

Metro Broadcasting upheld two FCC programs designed to increase
minority ownership2 9 of radio and television broadcasting licenses. 30
Both programs were principally designed to further first-amendment diversity concerns. Neither program was formally codified by Congress.
One program considers minority ownership a "plus" in comparing the
merits of competing applications for a broadcasting license. 31 Other factors in this comparative procedure include the past broadcast record, the
proposed program service, and the owner participation in station operation. 32 Minority status thus need not be dispositive, although it turned
out to be the decisive factor in the licensing award under review in Metro
Broadcasting. 33 The second program is a "distress sale" policy that allows an FCC-approved minority enterprise to purchase at a "distress"
price a license from a broadcaster whose qualifications have been called
into question. 34 Typically, a license holder whose qualifications are subject to challenge may not transfer that license until the challenge has
been favorably resolved by the FCC. Because distress sales are limited to
minority owners, race is dispositive in this FCC preference.
28. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
29. Minority ownership extends to entities "a majority of whose ownership interests are held by
a member or members of a minority group." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 44,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMlN. NEWS 2261, 2288. For an extended treatment of
minority eligibility, see Note, FCC Tax Certificates for Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities,
138 U. PA. L. REv. 979, 988-92 (1990).
30. Separate challenges, against each of the two programs, were launched by nonminorities
who were denied a license awarded to a racial minority. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110
s. Ct. 2997, 3005-08 (1990).
31. See WPIX, Inc., 68 F.C.C.2d 381, 411-12 (1978).
32. See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 395-98 (1965).
33. See Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1989), aff'd
sub nom. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
34. See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979,
983 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Statement].
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Differences between the comparative hearing preference and the distress sale set-aside loomed large in the lower courts. The comparative
preference was upheld, in part because "it d[id] not involve any quotas or
fixed targets whatsoever, and minority ownership [was] simply one factor
among several."35 In contrast, the distress sale policy was invalidated, in
part because "the policy singles out one aspect of diversity and elevates it
to determinative status."36 The Supreme Court, however, treated the
two programs as part of a unified effort to increase minority ownership
and found that neither program placed an undue burden on nonminority
interests. 37
In reaching this conclusion, the Court did not discuss the distinction
it drew in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 38 between a
comparative preference (the Harvard plan) and a set-aside (the Davis
plan).39 Apparently, because the distress policy applies "only with respect to a small fraction of broadcast licenses"40 and because nonminority firms exercise some control over whether distress sales occur at
all, the Court concluded that the program was not a set-aside.41 Furthermore, the Court noted that both FCC policies carry their own "natural
limit" for minority preferences and will end "once sufficient diversity has
been achieved."42
The Court paid considerably more attention to two other Supreme
Court affirmative action rulings, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 43
and Fullilove v. Klutznick.44 In Croson, the Court invalidated, under
strict scrutiny review, efforts to set aside city-allocated contracting dollars for racial minorities. 45 Although the Court acknowledged that Congress is " 'expressly charged by the Constitution with competence and
authority to enforce equal protection guarantees' " 46 and thereby drew a
sharp line between state and federal race preferences, Croson nonetheless
raises the specter that strict scrutiny would be appropriate in reviewing
federal race preferences. Indeed, Justice O'Connor's Croson opinion expressly rejeets the notion that section 5 justifies "some form of federal
35. Winter Park, 873 F.2d at 354.
36. Schurberg Broadcasting v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
37. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3025-27 (1990).
38. 438 u.s. 265 (1978).
39. See id. at 311-19.
40. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3026-27.
41. Id. at 3027.
42. Id. at 3025 (emphasis added).
43. 109 s. Ct. 706 (1989).
44. 448 u.s. 448 (1980).
45. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 721, 730.
46. Id. at 718 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483).
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pre-emption in matters of race."47
In Fullilove, the Court upheld a congressional plan setting aside federal construction grants for minority groups in response to a legislative
finding of societal discrimination. 48 While broadly approving of Congress's power to remedy societal discrimination and recognizing the extraordinary deference owed to congressional fact finding, 4 9 Chief Justice
Burger, in writing the Court's plurality opinion, as well as the Department of Justice in submitting a brief defending the program, took great
pains to depict the set-aside as a "strictly remedial measure"50 and hence
within Congress's section 5 power. 5 1 Moreover, a majority of Justices in
Fullilove, while neither endorsing nor rejecting strict review, nonetheless
pointed to strict review as a possible measure of federal affirmative
action. 5 2
Concerns raised by Croson and Fullilove clearly influenced those defending the program. The FCC and Senate briefs53 presume strict review, 54 characterize the program as serving both diversity and remedial
objections,55 and suggest that the program is statutorily mandated. 56
The Metro Broadcasting Court, however, found the FCC preference on
stronger precedential footing than either the FCC or Senate thought
possible.
47. Id. at 720.
48. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 492.
49. For an assessment and critique of the standards established by Congress for the formulation
and judicial review of minority set-aside programs, see generally Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453
(1987).
50. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 481.
51. There are, by my counting, at least 23 references in the Justice Department brief to the
remedial nature of the Local Public Works Act set-aside. See Brieffor the United States, Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (No. 78-1007).
52. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 492; id. at 518-19 (Marshall, J., concurring). Of the six Justices joining in these opinions, only Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and White are still on the Court.
53. The Department of Justice, through the Solicitor General, typically defends the constitutionality of federal programs before the Supreme Court. In Metro Broadcasting, however, the Bush
Department of Justice considered the FCC preference unconstitutional and filed a brief to that effect. See Brief for the United States, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No.
89-453). Consequently, the Solicitor General allowed the FCC to defend its program before the
Court. See Brief for Federal Communications Commission at 50 n.*, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453). The Senate brief was filed on the request of the Senate
pursuant to Senate Resolution 251, introduced by Senator Mitehell and approved by the Senate. See
136 CoNG. R.Ec. S1775-76 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1990). The Department ofJustice decision to formally
oppose the FCC preference was the impetus of the Senate resolution. See id. at S1776 (remarks of
Sen. Mitchell).
54. See Brief for Federal Communications Commission at 27, Metro Broadeasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453) (asserting that "[t]he minority enhancement credit serves
... compelling government interests") (emphasis added); id. at 35 (arguing that "[t]he minority
enhancement credit is narrowly tailored") (emphasis added). Neither parties' brief argues that middle tier review should be used in place of strict scrutiny.
55. See supra note 11.
56. See supra note 11.

132
HeinOnline -- 69 Tex. L. Rev. 132 1990-1991

Requiem for a Heavyweight
The Court rejected Croson out of hand as being irrelevant for assessing federal efforts. Noting that Croson itself drew a sharp line between
federal and state use of race preferences, Justice Brennan concluded that
Croson's embrace of strict review was inapplicable "to a benign racial
classification employed by Congress." 57 Consequently, since Fullilove
did not formally endorse a standard of review, he concluded that precedent did not constrain the Metro Broadcasting Court's choice of a standard of review. 5 8
The question remained, however, whether the FCC preference
would have to be characterized as remedial. Although Fullilove had addressed congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment
through a remedial set-aside, the Metro Broadcasting Court interpreted
the case as suggesting more generally that the courts should defer to
Congress's employment of race preferences because of Congress's "institutional competence as the national legislature. " 59 The Court therefore
found it unnecessary to employ a remedial constraint and instead held
that "benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress--even if
those measures are not 'remedial' ...-are constitutionally permissible to
the extent that they serve important governmental objectives within the
power of Congress and are substantially related to [the] achievement of
those objectives."60
Under this relaxed standard of review, the Court had little difficulty
upholding the FCC plan. First, by referring to appropriations bills that
temporarily prohibit the FCC from modifying its preference program,
the Court characterized the FCC preference as congressionally mandated. 61 In a similar vein, the Court concluded that "Congress has made
clear its view that the minority ownership policies advance the goal of
diverse prograrnrning."62 The Court derived legislative intent from proposed legislation,63 hearings, 64 failed efforts to undermine the diversity
57. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3009 (1990).
58. See id. at 3007-08 & n.13 (acknowledging that there is no clearly established standard of
review that can be derived from the Court's earlier Fullilove case).
59. /d. at 3008.
60. Id. at 3008-09 (footnote omitted).
61. See id. at 3006 & n.9, 3012.
62. Id. at 3012.
63. Id. at 3013, 3015-16 (citing S. 1277, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CoNG. REc. 13742 (1987);
S. 1095, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CoNG. REc. 9745 (1987); H.R. 1090, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133
CoNG. R.Ec. 3300 (1987); H.R. 293, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. 860 (1987); S. 2004,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CoNG. REc. 14813 (1969)).
64. I d. at 3013-16 (citing Broadcasting Improvements Act of 1987: Hearings on S. 1277 Before
the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1987); FCC and NT/A Authorizations: Hearings on H.R. 2472 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 130.31, 211·12 (1987); FCC Authorization: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
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preferences, 65 and Congress's enactment of related legislation that accorded racial minorities a preference in obtaining broadcast licenses. 66
Second, by referring to a slew of cases upholding FCC regulations of
broadcasters to ensure the" 'wildest [sic] possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources,' " 67 the Court found
broadcast diversity "at the very least" an important governmental objective. 68 Third, although the FCC never sought to establish a nexus between minority ownership and diversity broadcasting,6 9 the Court easily
found the FCC's means and ends to be substantially related.
As a starting point, the Court noted that "[w]ith respect to this
'complex' empirical question, we are required to give 'great weight to the
decisions of Congress and the experience of the Commission.' " 70 Specifically, the Court viewed the diversity preference as an appropriate response to the rock and the hard place between which the FCC found
itself between in 1978. In that year, the FCC concluded that its raceneutral efforts to ensure adequate representation of minority views were
unsuccessful. 71 However, the FCC felt constrained by both first-amendment principles and problems of implementation from more directly interfering with broadcast programming. 72 Consequently, it attacked the
problem indirectly, by focusing on minority ownership and presuming a
link to program diversity. The Court deemed this FCC action an appropriate response to the situation the agency faced. Furthermore, although
Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, tOOth Cong., 1st
Sess. 55 (1987); Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for
Fiscal Year 1988: Hearings on H.R. 2763 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, tOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Minority-Owned Broadcast Stations: Hearing on H.R. 5373
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection. and Finance of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1986); Broadcast License Renewal Act:
Hearings on S. 16 et al Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 325-29, 376-81, 408-11, pt. 2, 785-800 (1974); Broadcast License
Renewal: Hearings on H.R. 5546 et al Before the Subcomm. on Communications and Power of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 495-97, 552-59, 57294, pt. 2, 686-89 (1973)).
65. Id. at 3013-15 (citing Communications Act of 1978: Hearings on H.R. 13015 Before the
Subcomm. on Communications of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 5, pt. 1, 59 (1978)).
66. Id. at 3014-16 (citing Co=unications Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259, 96
Stat. 1087 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1982))).
67. Id. at 3010 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
68. Id.
69. See Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales and Tax
Certificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, 1 F.C.C. Rec. 1315, 1316
(1986), 52 Fed. Reg. 596 (January 7, 1987) [hereinafter Reexamination].
70. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3011 (quoting Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Co=., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973)).
71. See 1978 Statement, supra note 34, at 980.
72. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3019 n.36, 3022 n.42.
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the FCC did not rely upon it,73 the Court pointed to "a host of empirical
evidence" 74 corroborating this presumed nexus.
In the end, Metro Broadcasting-rather than "press[ing] the outer
limits of Congressional authority" as did the Fullilove set-aside75-was
characterized as an easy case. For the Court, the diversity objective is
"at least" important and the presumed ownership-diversity nexus appears the only mechanism available to accomplish that objective without
trammeling on first-amendment rights. Furthermore, there is no undue
burden on nonminority interests. In fact, the Court's analysis suggests
that the FCC preference wonld be upheld even under a strict scrutiny
review.
II. The Road Taken: An Assessment of Metro Broadcasting
Every substantive feature of Metro Broadcasting is unsatisfactorynamely, the failure to distinguish between the distress sale and comparative hearing preferences, the utilization of middle tier rather than strict
review, the depiction of the preference program as congressionally mandated, and, most important, the conclusion that the FCC preference easily passes scrutiny under middle tier review and might well be upheld
under strict review. This Part, in demonstrating the failings of Metro
Broadcasting, will be organized under two major headings. First, an examination of the history of the preference programs reveals that the program is not congressionally mandated. Second, a consideration of the
values that underlie the equality guarantee point to the impropriety of
both the utilization of middle tier review and the majority's embrace of
the diversity rationale. 7 6
73. See Brief for Federal Communications Commission at 41-44, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453) (noting that the courts, congressional reports, and other
sources have concluded that such a nexus exists).
74. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3017.
75. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 490 (1980).
76. This Part will not discuss two of the failings, namely, the failure to distinguish between the
two programs and the characterization of the programs as temporary. These matters are sufficiently
obvious to be dispensed with in a footnote.
It is preposterous to suggest that the distress sale preference is indistinguishable in kind from
the comparative hearing preference because it applies "only with respect to a small fraction of broadcast licenses." Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3026-27. Justice Powell's distinction of the Davis
and Harvard plan in Bakke had nothing to do with the size of the Davis quota. It had everything to
do with the nature of the quota, that is, the reservation of slots only for minority students. As the
distress sale preference is available only to minority entrepreneurs, the distinction drawn in Bakke
seems quite relevant. Admittedly, Justice Powell spoke only for himself when he characterized the
distinction between a comparative preference and an exclusive opportunity as dispositive. Nonetheless, to reject Justice Powell is to rejeet the legal significance of the distinction, not its existence.
Metro Broadcasting seemingly rejects the existence of the distinction.
Metro Broadcasting is also incorrect in characterizing the diversity preference as temporary
because "once sufficient diversity has been achieved" the preferences will end. Id. at 3025. First, as
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Congress and the FCC Preference

Court action and presidential initiative are the sources of the comparative hearing and distress sale preferences.77 The comparative hearing preference is rooted in TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 78 a 1973 D.C. Court of
Appeals decision. TV 9 was an appeal of the FCC's refusal to value minority status in according a broadcast license. The FCC's position was
that " 'the Communications Act, like the Constitution, is color blind.
What the Communications Act demands is service to the public ... and
that factor alone must control the licensing processes, not the race, color
or creed of an applicant.' " 79 In other words, the FCC in 1972 rejected
the nexus between minority ownership and diversity programming. 80
The D.C. Circuit overturned this FCC practice, emphasizing that it is
"consistent with the primary objective of maximum diversification of
ownership" to award comparative preferences on the basis of race "when
minority ownership is likely to increase diversity of content." 81 In accordance with TV 9, the FCC instructed its Administrative Law Judges
to afford comparative merit to applicants when minority owners were to
a factual matter, the Court's statement is simply incorrect. The preference exists whenever there is
minority underrepresentation. "Once diversity is achieved," the preference is merely placed on hold.
Second, the dramatic underrepresentation of minorities in the broadcast media as well as FCC policy
favoring existing (overwhelmingly nonminority) license holders suggests that the problem of minority underrepresentation-and with it the FCC preference-is likely to persist for some time. While
this state of affairs arguably supports the need for a preference, it also suggests that the preference is
far from temporary.
77. The FCC's commitment to diversity dates back to a 1965 policy statement concluding that
"[d]iversification of control is a public good in a free society." Policy Statement on Comparative
Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394 (1965). The Supreme Court upheld the FCC's ownership
diversification policies in FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
In that case, the Court stated that the public interest licensing standard of§ 303(r) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1982), extends to "the First Amendment goal of achieving
'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.' " National
Citizens Comm., 436 U.S. at 795 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
78. 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974). For commentary on TV
9, see Note, In Comparative Hearings for Broadcast Licenses, the FCC Must Award Merit for Minor-

ity Ownership of a Broadcast Applicant Where that Ownership is Likely to Increase Diversity of Opinion and Viewpoint: TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 52 TExAs L. REv. 806 (1974).
79. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 1, 17 (1972) (quoting Mid-Florida Television
Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 34, 268 (1970) (Hearing Examiner's Initial Decision)), rev'd sub nom. TV 9, Inc.
v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974).
80. The FCC stated: " 'There is nothing in the degree or type of participation proposed by [the
black owners] which gives assurance that the benefits of their racial background would inure in any
material degree to the operation of the station.' " /d. (quoting Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33
F.C.C.2d 34, 268 (1970) (Hearing Examiner's Initial Decision)).
81. TV9, 495 F.2d at 937. As the D.C. Circuit observed in a subsequent opinion: "The entire
thrust of TV 9 is that Black ownership and participation together are themselves likely to bring
about programming that is responsive to the needs of the black citizenry, and that 'reasonable expectation,' without 'advance demonstration,' gives them relevance.'' Garrett v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1056,
1063 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (footnotes omitted).
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participate in the operation of the station. 82
The distress sale exception is an outgrowth of a White House policy.
In January 1978, the Carter Administration announced that "[b]ecause
of telecommunications' vital role in social, economic, and political progress, full minority participation [in ownership] is a critical component of
President Carter's economic and social policy goals."83 Specifically, the
White House proposed, among other things, tax breaks for broadcasters
who sell their stations to minority owners and the distress sale exception. 84 The FCC endorsed these features of the White House proposal in
May 1978. 85 Pointing to FCC task force findings (issued one week earlier) of" '[a]cute underrepresentation of minorities among the owners of
broadcast properties,' " 86 the FCC claimed race preferences as necessary
to serve the goal of "a more diverse selection of programming'' through
"[t]ull minority participation in the ownership and management of
broadcast facilities."87
Metro Broadcasting does not dispute the above account. Moreover,
Metro Broadcasting does not suggest that Congress has codified the FCC
preference. However, the FCC preference is characterized as being "specifically approved-indeed, mandated-by Congress," a fact of "overriding significance" in the Court's analysis. 88
The Court points to four categories of congressional action to support its proposition. First, Congress in 1969, 1973, and 1974 failed to
enact legislation that would likely have had the effect of limiting minority ownership opportunities in the broadcasting industry. 89 Yet failure to
enact legislation prior to the establishment of FCC policy could not
82. See 1978 Statement, supra note 34, at 982. The FCC also ordered the expedited processing
of minority applications. See id.
83. Telecommunication Minority Assistance Program, 1977-78 PUB. PAPERS 252 (Pres.

Carter).
84. I d. at 253. For an analysis of the tax certificate program, see Note, supra note 29 (concluding that the tax certificate program, while worthwhile, is probably unconstitutional absent appropriate findings of past discrimination and reauthorization by Congress).
85. See 1978 Statement, supra note 34, at 983. In addition to the tax certificate and distress sale
programs, cable broadcasters are also required to comply with the FCC's Equal Employment Opportunity requirements. 47 C.F.R. § 76.71 (1989); see also Comment, Constitutionality of Affirmative Action Requirements Imposed Under the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 35 CATH.
U.L. REv. 807 (1986) (arguing that the FCC's regulation of the employment practices of cable
operators violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
86. 1978 Statement, supra note 34, at 981 (quoting MINORITY OWNERSHIP TASKFORCE, FEDERAL CoMMUNICATIONS CoMM'N, MINORITY OWNERSHIP REPoRT (1978)). Minority ownership
of media property, as compared to the percentage of minorities in the population, is minute. In
October 1986, less than 250 of over 11,000 radio and television stations were owned by minorities.
Note, supra note 29, at 981 (citing NATIONAL Ass'N OF BROADCASTERS, MINORITY BROADCASTING FACTS 6, 8 (1986)).
87. 1978 Statement, supra note 34, at 981.
88. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3008 (1990).
89. Id. at 3013.
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speak to Congress's approval or mandate of the diversity preferences.
Congressional acquiescence simply cannot occur until the policy to
which Congress might acquiesce is in place. 90 Second, in response to
Reagan FCC efforts to reexamine the diversity preference,9 1 Congress
considered proposals to codify the FCC's minority ownership policies. 92
These proposals were not enacted, however, and consequently lend no
support to the proposition that Congress strongly favored the diversity
preference. 93
Third, in 1981 and 1982, Congress authorized a lottery procedure
for the granting of broadcast licenses that included a minority preference.94 Specifically, with "the [congressional] objective of increasing the
number of media outlets owned by [minorities]," 95 minority applicants
were accorded a "significant preference"96 in the lottery. Undoubtedly,
the lottery statute is suggestive of congressional support for the diversity
rule. Neither the language nor legislative history of the lottery statute,
however, demands that the FCC pursue either its comparative hearing or
distress sale preference. As Justice White exclaimed in his questioning of
FCC counsel Daniel Armstrong, Court reliance on the lottery statute is
inappropriate because "that isn't what the FCC has done." 97
Fourth (and most significant), Congress in 1987 enacted, and in
each subsequent year reenacted, limitation riders prohibiting the FCC
from reexamining its comparative hearing and diversity preferences. 98
90. Moreover, congressional acquiescence is of dubious relevance in establishing legislative purpose. See supra notes I 6-17. For scholarly commentary, see Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20, 41 n.95 (1988) (suggesting that a "legislature's failure to overturn a
[court's] statutory [interpretation] ... may indicate inattention, uninterest, or shortness of time");
Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into "Speculative
Unrealities," 64 B.U.L. REv. 737, 741, 764-65 (1984) (arguing that silence is a poor measure of
legislative purpose); Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congressional
and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 513, 515, 524-35 (1982) (proposing a syntax that limits the
significance of congressional legislative silences).
91. See Reexamination, supra note 69.
92. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3015-16.
93. If anything, Congress's failure to codifY the diversity preference suggests weak congressional support for the preference.
94. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357, 736-37
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (1982)) (establishing the lottery); Communications
Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259, §§ 115(c)(l)-(2), 96 Stat. 1087, 1094 (codified at 47
U.S. C. § 309(i)(3)(A) (1982)) (amending the lottery provisions to accord special preferences to minority groups).
95. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 208, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 187, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1010, 1259.
96. Communications Amendments Act of 1982, § 115(c)(l). For example, minority applicants
might be counted twice in the lottery pool. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 44,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2261, 2288.
97. Transcript of Oral Arguments at 39, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997
(1990) (No. 89-453).
98. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appro-
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These riders prohibit the FCC from expending appropriated funds to
"repeal" or "reexamine" FCC preferences designed to "expand minority
and [female] ownership of broadcasting licenses."99 Because appropriation bills are enacted annually, limitation riders lapse at the end of each
fiscal year: Consequently, Congress must reenact these riders each year
or the limitation no longer constrains the agency. 100
The FCC rider was first passed as a preemptive strike against FCC
efforts to reexamine its race and gender preferences. This reexamination
was spurred by Steele v. FCC, 101 a case that called the FCC's gender
preference into doubt because "the Commission has been unable to offer
any evidence other than statistieal underrepresentation to support its
bold assertion that more women station owners would increase programming diversity." 102 Specifically, during the Steele litigation, the FCC
asked that the case be returned so that it could conduct a proceeding to
determine "whether there is a nexus between [FCC] preference schemes
and enhanced diversity." 103 The FCC asserted that such a proceeding
was necessary because the presumed nexus "fail[ed] to pass constitutional muster" under its reading of Supreme Court decisions. 104
Congress was outraged by this reexamination. Already antagonized
by FCC efforts to repeal the Fairness Doctrine, 105 as well as the FCC's
weak enforcement of its prohibition of dual television and newspaper
priations Act, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 1987 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMlN. NEws (101 Stat.)
1329, 1329-31; Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies
Appropriation Act, 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-459, 1988 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMlN. NEWS (102 Stat.)
2186, 2216; Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-162, 1989 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMlN. NEWS (103 Stat.)
988, 1020.
99. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-162, 1989 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMlN. NEWS (103 Stat.) 988,
1020.
100. See generally Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987
DUKE L.J. 456 (analyzing institutional characteristics that prevent full consideration and articulation of policy in appropriations bills).
101. 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Two months after the initial decision in Steele by the D.C.
Circuit, the court held an en bane rehearing and vacated the judgement.
102. Id. at 1199. For an analysis of Steele and the FCC reaction to it, see Comment, The Female
Merit Policy in Steele v. FCC: "A Whim Leading to a Better World?" 37 AM. U.L. REv. 379 (1988).
103. Reexamination, supra note 69, at 13.
104. Minority-Owned Broadcast Stations: Hearing on H.R. 5373 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1986) (citing Steele remand brief at 19) [hereinafter Steele Hearings].
105. Broadcasting magazine, commenting on the FCC's repeal of the Fairness Doctrine in the
wake of Congress's effort to codify it, observed that "[t]he move so poisoned relations between the
two entities that it stimulated congressional oversight of a magnitude Washington insiders say is
unprecedented." Micromanagement of the FCC: Here to Stay?, BROADCASTING, Dec. 26, 1988, at
56.
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ownership in a single market, 106 members of the House Committee overseeing the FCC castigated all five Commissioners for their refusal to
honor congressional preferences. 107 The outgrowth of this hearing was
the first of the limitation riders. The Senate Report accompanying this
rider noted that the FCC reexamination was "unwarranted" antl that the
Congress "has found that promoting diversity of ownership of broadcast
properties satisfies important public policy goals." 108
The Metro Broadcasting Court, in looking at the report language
and related hearings, was correet in concluding that Congress approves
of and has "[kept] the FCC's minority ownership policies in p1ace." 109
The Court was wrong, however, in labeling the diversity programs congressionally "mandated,'' 110 implying that enactment of a limitation
rider is functionally equivalent to legislative authorization. In complete
contrast to the normal state of affairs, limitation riders are necessarily
temporary measures; if Congress ever declines to reenact the rider, the
FCC would be free to rescind its diversity preference. The FCC riders
then cannot be viewed as Congress's mandate that the FCC pursue its
diversity preferences. Because the riders merely prevent the FCC from
reexamining its preference programs, this limitation is uninstructive in
understanding congressional purpose. 1 1 1
Practical problems associated with treating appropriation riders as
substantive legislation also support this limited reading of the FCC riders. In a 1987 study I concluded:
[A]ppropriation riders are single-year measures-necessarily susceptible to changing circumstances. Although the [lower federal]
courts have tended to provide substantive interpretations of appropriations by looking to legislative history and by recognizing that
Congress often legislates in the appropriations process, such interpretations are suspect and should not be undertaken. Otherwise,
courts, in the name of legislative intent, will create binding precedents that may ultimately frustrate Congress's ability to express its
106. See Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical Look at the Fiscal Year 1988 Continuing
Resolution, 1988 DuKE L.J. 389, 414-21.
107. Congressman John Bryant characterized it as "almost pointless" to work with the Commission, Steele Hearings, supra note 104, at 31; Congressman Mickey Leland referred to the need to
draft "FCC proof" legislation as well as the need to "fight this Commission tooth and nail" on civil
rights matters, id. at 20; and Congressman Edward Markey labeled the reexamination "a cloudburst
in a storm of suspicion and distrust which seems to hover over this commission," id. at 22.
108. S. REP. No. 182, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1987).
109. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3016 (1990).
110. Id. at 3008.
111. This point was made in oral argument. In response to the FCC counsel's assertion that
"this is Congress now that's acted," Justice White remarked: "(B]ut all Congress said .•. [is] that it
didn't want you to change." Transcript of Oral Arguments at 39, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453).
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desires. 112
This conclusion is consistent with Supreme Court precedents that draw a
sharp line between authorizations and appropriations.m
Congressional support for the FCC preferences, while clear, falls
short of a legislative mandate. To the extent that Metro Broadcasting's
choice of middle tier review or its conclusion that minority ownership is
substantially related to program diversity hinges on the congressional
"mandate" for the FCC preference, the Court's reasoning is subject to
question.
B.

Diversity and the Equality Principle

The major surprise of Metro Broadcasting was that the Court
crossed the abyss separating remedial and nonremedial justifications for
affirmative action without hesitation. Although Justice Powell (in
Bakke), 114 Justice O'Connor (in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 11 5), and Justice Stevens (in Johnson v. Transportation Agency 1 16) had
all indicated that affirmative action could be justified on nonremedial
grounds, the Court had never seriously considered nonremedial justifications for race preferences. Instead, in cases involving both federal and
state programs, the debate revolved around classic remedial questions of
112. Devins, supra note 100, at 498 (footnotes omitted).
113. See, e.g., Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 361 (1978) ("The distinction [between appropriations and authorizations] is maintained 'to assure that program and financial matters are considered independently of one another, [thereby preventing the Appropriations Committee] from
trespassing on substantive legislation.'") (quoting HOUSE BUDGET CoMM., 95111 CoNG., 1ST SESS.,
CoNGRESSiONAL CoNTROL OF ExPENDITURES 19 (Comm. Print 1977)); Tennessee Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978) (''We recognize that both substantive enactments and appropriations
measures are 'Acts of Cougress,' but the latter have the limited and specific purpose ·of providing
funds for authorized programs..•• [Otherwise], every appropriations measure would be pregnant
with prospects of altering substantive legislation ...•").
114. Justice Powell noted that the first-amendment value of selecting a group of stndeuts to
foster the "robust exchange of ideas" independently supports the use of race as a plus factor in
university admissions. Regents of the Uuiv. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978); see generally
Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory?, 61 CALlF. L. REv. 21 (1979)
(dissecting the theoretical bases of Justice Powell's reasoning in Bakke).
115. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). Justice O'Connor suggested that Bakke might be extended to
nonremedial settings. See id. at 286-87 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor, however, has
never upheld an affirmative acti!)n plan on nonremedial grounds. Moreover, Justice O'Connor's
dissent in Metro Broadcasting suggests that she no longer endorses nonremedial justifications for
affirmative action. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3034 (1990) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (asserting that modem equal protection doctrine has recognized that "remedying the
effects of racial discrimination" is the ouly compelling interest that will support the government's
use of racial classifications).
116. 480 U.S. 616 (1987). Justice Stevens perceives backward-looking remedial affirmative action as too limiting. For Stevens, "in many cases the employer will find it more appropriate to
cousider other legitimate reasons to give preferences to members of underrepresented groups." I d. at
646 (Stevens, J., concurring).

141
HeinOnline -- 69 Tex. L. Rev. 141 1990-1991

Texas Law Review

Vol. 69:125, 1990

defining the wrongdoer and the scope of the violation. 117 As Professor
Kathleen Sullivan observed, the Court "approve[s] affirmative action
only as precise· penance for the specific sins of racism ... committed in
the past." 118
This remedial emphasis is hardly surprising. The values that underlie the Court's equality jurisprudence-separation of functions and antidiscrimination-effectively limit government to the use of race for
remedial measures.tt9
Separation of functions lies at the heart of the Court's two-tiered
classification approach. Government, for the most part, is presumed
trustworthy and hence may draw distinctions among people without intrusive judicial scrutiny. The important exception to this rule is that
"[c]lassifying persons according to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public concems." 120 In other words, because "[t]hese factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any
legitimate state interest," 121 "judicial deference is no longer justified." 122
The antidiscrimination principle is the principle disfavoring all racedependent decision making. 123 In the words of Justice Stevens: "Persons
of different races, like persons of different religious faiths and different
political beliefs, are equal in the eyes of the law." 124 As such, the antidiscrimination principle furthers liberal individualism and discourages, as
Professor Michael Perry puts it, "racialism, the mental habit of thinking
about and dealing with persons of races, other than one's own, not as
individuals, but as 'blacks,' 'whites,' and so forth." 125
117. See, e.g., Wygant, 416 U.S. at 274-76 (rejecting as a justification for an affirmative action
teacher layoff provision the argument that minority students need role models as a remedy for general societal discrimination, and requiring instead that the remedy bear some relation to prior discriminatory practices by the particular school board); United States v. Lawrence County School
Dist., 799 F.2d 1031, 1043 (5th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that changing school district zones did not
exceed the scope of the violation when the school board continually violated an original court desegregation order prohibiting "zone jumping"); Seattle School Dist. v. Washington, 633 F.2d 1338,
1345 (9th Cir. 1980) (declaring invalid a state statute prohibiting school boards from busing students
across district lines on the grounds that "judicial desegregation remedies could not exceed the geographical scope of the constitutional violation"), a.ff'd, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
118. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Comment, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's
Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARv. L. REv. 78, 80 (1986).
119. See generally Devins, The Rhetoric of Equality, 43 VAND. L. REv. (forthcoming).
120. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
121. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
122. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
123. See generally Brest, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 1-12 (1976); Strauss, The Myth ofCo(orblindness, 1986
SUP. Cr. REv. 99, 116-30.
124. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 650 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv.
540, 550 (1977).
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In the case of ''benign" 126 discrimination, separation of functions
and antidiscrimination values diverge. Separation of functions does not
bar the affirmative use of race. In the words of Professor John Hart Ely,
"When the group that controls the decision making process classifies so
as to advantage a minority and disadvantage itself, the reasons for being
unusually suspicious, and, consequently, employing a stringent brand of
review, are lacking." 127 Antidiscrimination's emphasis on individual
self-worth is more limiting, however. If minorities and nonminorities are
similarly situated vis-a-vis race, distinctions between the benign and pernicious use of race are senseless. Alexander Bickel, in a passage often
quoted by the Reagan Justice Department, 128 put it this way:
"[D]iscrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society. Now
this is to be unlearned and we are told that this is not a matter of fundamental principle but only a matter of whose ox is gored."I 2 9
This is not to say either that antidiscrimination absolutely forbids
race-dependent decision making or that separation of functions always
endorses race-conscious action that benefits minorities. With respect to
antidiscrimination, in order to discourage racist conduct, wrongdoers
must be forced to remedy their racist conduct-even if it is impossible to
locate the "actual victim" of discrimination. With respect to separation
of functions, affirmative action programs must truly serve minority interests at the expense of nonminority interests. Otherwise, the group-disadvantaging principle that permits endorsement of race preferences
under separation-of-functions principles would evaporate. For example,
126. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3008 (1990). Justices Brennan and
O'Connor are at odds on whether the Court can successfully distinguish benign from pernicious
classifications. Whereas Justice Brennan is "confident" of the Court's ability to do so, id. at 3008
n.12, Justice O'Connor labels benign racial classifications a "contradiction in terms" because" 'benign' carries with it no independent meaning," id. at 3033 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The disagreement within the Court itself shows that Justice O'Connor has the upper hand here; the line
separating benign from pernicious discrimination is not obvious. Justice Brennan and supporters of
the program saw the nexus between minority ownership and program diversity as an appropriate
recognition of cultural diversity, id. at 3016-17, while opponents such as Justice O'Connor characterized the presumptive nexus as racist stereotyping, see id. at 3037 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In
gender cases, feminists sharply disagree in their characterization of gender preferences. Some feminists, for example, see maternity leave and other pregnancy-related "benefits" as a mechanism to
perpetuate gender roles. See, e.g., Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/
Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 329 (1984-85). Other feminists
see this endorsement of strict equality as "part of the way male dominance is expressed in the law."
C. MAcKINNON, FEMlNISM UNMODIFIED 44 (1987). This difficulty of sorting out benign and pernicious suggests that Justice Brennan is a bit cavalier in his confidence in the judiciary's ability here.
127. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. au. L. REv. 723, 735
(1974).
128. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11, Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (No. 84-1340).
129. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CoNSENT 133 (1975).
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a quota designed to ensure that minorities continue to be overrepresented
in "second class" job categories would not be entitled to deference on
separation-of-functions grounds.
The diversity rationale endorsed in Metro Broadcasting raises concerns under both antidiscrimination and separation-of-functions analyses. Diversity values a cross-representation of viewpoints and assumes
that group status-at least "in the aggregate"1 30-is a proxy for the representation of certain views. With respect to the FCC preference, the
diversity rationale presumes that racial status will influence the programming decisions of black and white license holders. 131 In focusing on
groups, diversity directly contradicts the ethos of individualism that underlies antidiscrimination. Moreover, while the FCC assumes that black
and white broadcasters will make different programming decisions, it
does not assume that black and white viewers will be racially stratified in
their viewing decisions. 132 However, that both minorities and nonminorities are intended beneficiaries of the presumed ownershipprogramming nexus exposes the FCC practice to criticism under the separation-of-functions rationale. The FCC preference can be characterized
as racist stereotyping designed to serve the predominantly nonminority
broadcasting audience. 133 On the other hand, the legislative and administrative record also supports interpretation of the FCC preference as a
measure designed principally to serve the minority audience and ouly
incidentally the nonminority audience. 134 This construction, although
debatable, at least answers the separation-of-functions concern.
The question remains whether separation-of-functions values should
trump antidiscrimination concerns when government adopts an affrrmative action plan. 135 Supreme Court affirmative action cases preceding
130. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3016.
131. As Justice O'Connor commented in her Metro Broadcasting dissent, the FCC preference
"embod[ies] stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their race, evaluating their thoughts
and efforts-their very worth as citizens-according to a criterion barred to the Government by
history and the Constitution." ld. at 3029 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
132. The FCC has argued that the underrepresentation of minority broadcasters "is detrimental
not only to the minority audience but to all of the viewing and listening public." 1978 Statement,
supra note 34, at 980-81. The FCC reasoned: "Adequate representation of minority viewpoints in
programming serves not only the needs and interests of the minority community but also enriches
and educates the non-minority audience." Id. at 981.
133. This concern is distinguishable from Justice O'Connor's concern that "[t]he policies impermissibly value individuals because they presume that persons think in a manner associated with their
race." Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3037 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For Justice O'Connor,
racial stereotyping is an inevitably pernicious categorization of an individual as a member of a racial
group. Separation of functions asks a different question: is government acting in a well-intentioned
manner?
134. See 1978 Statement, supra note 34, at 979-80.
135. Academic debate on this question is legion. Compare, e.g., Ely, supra note 127, at 724-25,
738-39 (arguing that separation of functions predominates) with Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage:
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Metro Broadcasting, rather than making one or the other value absolute,
are a hybrid of sorts. In accord with antidiscrimination, the Court held
there must be "convincing evidence that remedial action is warranted."136 Otherwise," 'a core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment'
which is to 'do away with all governmentally imposed distinctions based
on race' " 137 will be undermined. At the same time, in accord with separation of functions, the Court has indicated that an affirmative action
plan "need not be limited to the remedying of specific instances of identified discrimination." 138 The Court has also indicated that a governmental actor-rather than being forced to make a contemporaneous finding
of discrimination-may "remedy" discrepancies in "the relevant labor
market" between qualified minority hires and qualified nonminority
hires. 139 Between these two values, antidiscrimination appears predominant. Separation-of-functions concerns merely temper the antidiscrimination value: while separation of functions liberalizes government's
ability to say there is a wrong in need of redress, the central value of
disfavoring nonremedial uses of race remains intact.
Metro Broadcasting ducked this remedial demand issue as well as
the antidiscrimination principle by distinguishing Congress's "benign"
use of race from other race-conscious decision making. In doing so, the
Court also rejected strict review in favor of middle tier review of Congress's affirmative action efforts. The endorsement of middle tier review
is pure sophistry. The core of the Court's argument is that case law supports judicial deference to congressional action. Consequently, because
no Court precedent formally applies strict review to federal affirmative
action, judicial deference supports a lowering of the strict scrutiny standard of review applicable to state and local affirmative action efforts.
The Court ignored its long-standing rule that "[t]his Court's approach to
... equal protection claims has always been precisely the same [for state
and federal action]." 140 In this case, the same means strict scrutiny reRace, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 810 (1979) (arguing that
antidiscrimination predominates for "in all we do in life ... , to treat any person less well than
another or to favor one any more than another for being black or white or brown or red, is wrong").
136. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (emphasis added).
137. Id. (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)) (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
139. See id. at 277. For further discussion of the remedial use of race classificatious, see id. at
284-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
140. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975). Ironically, Justice Brennan wrote
Wiesenfeld. For another case suggestive of a uniform state-federal standard, see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973) (rejecting the rational basis analysis for gender-based classification by a federal statute, based upon the Court's earlier rejection of the analysis as applied to a state
statute).
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view, the standard applied in Croson. 141
My argument for strict review should not be interpreted as suggesting that federal power to make use of racial classification reaches no
further than state power in this area. The respect owed a coequal
branch, Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the checks against ill-considered action inherent in the structure of government all speak to judicial deference to congressional decision making
in the equal protection realm.l 42 Consequently, in Fullilove, the furthering of equal protection values by redressing systemic societal discrimination warranted judicial deference to the assessment of both legislative
means and ends.l 43 For this reason, Chief Justice Burger's plurality
opinion concludes that the set-aside upheld in Fullilove would pass muster under strict review.l 44
Metro Broadcasting is on a different footing, however. Rather than
enforcing or furthering equal protection values, the FCC policy advances
first-amendment diversity values at the expense of equal protection race
neutrality values. At this level, the FCC preference seems subject to the
Supreme Court's admonition that judicial deference should not be shown
to congressional action that dilutes equal protection decisions. 145
These concerns, given Metro Broadcasting's suggestion that the
FCC preferences may very well satisfy strict review, may seem merely
symbolic. Symbols matter quite a lot, however. The operational phrases
in equality decision making have no fixed meaning. 146 A compelling in141. The embrace of strict scrutiny in Croson had seemingly established the uniform state-federal standard to be applied in affirmative action cases. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
109 S. Ct. 706, 721 (1989). Indeed, in a case decided shortly after Croson, H.K. Porter Co. v. Metro. politan Dade County, the Supreme Court vacated "for further consideration in light of [Croson]" a
federal appeals court decision upholding a Department of Transportation affirmative action plan.
109 S. Ct. 1333 (1989) (mem.), vacating 825 F.2d 324 (11th Cir. 1987).
142. See generally Nathanson, Congressional Power to Contradict the Supreme Court's Constitutional Decisions: Accommodation of Rights in Conflict, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 331 (1986).
143. The Fullilove Court was extraordinarily deferential. With respect to legislative ends, the
Court uoted that Congress's failure to engage in specific fact finding was not problematic becanse
"Congress had abundant historical basis from which it could conclude that traditional procurement
practices ... perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
478 (1980) (emphasis added). With respect to legislative means, the Court referred to "the wellestablished concept that a legislature may take one step at a time to remedy only part of a broader
problem." /d. at 485 (emphasis added). See generally Days, supra note 49, at 463-76.
144. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 492.
145. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.IO (1966). This feature of Katzenbach-the socalled "ratehet" theory-is quite controversial. Many co=entators perceive that Congress's power
to expand rights protection necessarily leads to a correlative power to reduce. For an excellent
introduction to this topic, sec Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 819, 830-34 (1986). See also Cohen, Congressional Power to
Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REv. 603, 614 (1975) (proposing a theory
that distinguishes between congressional competence to make "liberty" and "federalism" judgments
as a possible resolntion to the ratchet theory controversy).
146. In a similar vein, Sanford Levinson argues that it is the interpreter of the Constitution,
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terest in one case may not be deemed a substantial interest in another;
substantially related may demand a tighter means-ends fit than a least
restrictive means requirement. Indeed, the few rational review cases that
strike down governmental action apply a more rigorous standard than
many middle tier and strict review decisions. 147 As a result, the battle
over the applicable standard of review is a battle over the characterization of the case. Given the malleability of equality standards, that characterization may well prove outcome determinative. 148 As Justice
O'Connor observed in dissent: "A lower standard [of review] signals that
the Government may resort to racial distinctions more readily [thereby
evidencing a] ... renewed toleration of racial classifications." 149
Metro Broadcasting fully evidences this tolerance. The notion that
first-amendment diversity concerns, in general, outweigh core equal protection concerns is dumbfounding. There is little doubt that the achievement of the widest "possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources" 150 furthers first-amendment values. Moreover,
there is no reason to doubt the FCC's argument that program diversity
objectives cannot be accomplished through race-neutral means "without
on-going government surveillance of the content of speech." 151 Nevertheless, this first-amendment defense of the diversity rule fails at two
levels. First, Supreme Court precedent recognizes that public interest
objectives may warrant limitations on broadcasters' first-amendment
rights. Second, even if the First Amendment bars race-neutral altemarather than the document's text, that defines the Constitution's meaning. See Levinson, Law as
Literature, 60 TExAs L. REv. 373, 384-86 (1982). In other words, the meaning of standardswhether they be constitutional provisions or standards of review-lies in the hands of the interpreter.
147. Compare, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (striking down a
zouing ordinance under a mere rationality standard) with Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) (upholding Japanese internment under strict review).
148. See generally Gunther, The Supreme Coun, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Mode/for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAR.v. L. REv. 1 (1972)
(criticizing the Court's two-tiered classification approach, under which the characterization of a case
may define the outcome).
149. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3033 (1990) (O'Counor, J., dissenting);
cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding FCC demands that broadcasters give each side of public issues fair treatment).
ISO. Brief for Federal Communications Commission at 30, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453).
151. Id. at 46. Justice Breunan also suggests that "insurmountable practical problems" of monitoring "the needs of every community" speak in favor of the presumed nexus. Metro Broadcasting,
110 S. Ct. at 3019. This suggestion, however, is fundamentally at odds with the Supreme Court's
clear rejection of "administrative convenience" jnstification for line drawing on the basis of race or
gender. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (arguing that "[a]lthough efficacious administration of governmental programs is not without some significance, 'the Constitution
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency' ") (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656
(1972)).
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tives, equal protection antidiscrimination concerns trump the firstamendment diversity value.
When it comes to the broadcast medium, the Supreme Court has
held that "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters which is paramount." 152 Relatedly, the Court has also
ruled that "in evaluating the first-amendment claims of [broadcasters,]
we must afford great weight to the decisions of Congress and the experience of the commission." 153 Indeed, the factors Metro Broadcasting cites
to support judicial deference to Congress's use of rac~ngress's factfinding expertise, status as a coequal branch, and institutional competence as the nationallegislature154-apply with equal force to the firstamendment arena. Consequently, it hardly seems surprising that the
first-amendment interest in broadcast diversity (recognized as at least
substantial and quite possibly compelling in Metro Broadcasting) should
outweigh the first-amendment rights of broadcasters (recognized by the
Court as secondary to the public's interest in media access).
Yet, even if the First Amendment bars race-neutral diversity regulations so that the presumptive ownership-broadcasting nexus is the ouly
mechanism that promises to further important diversity objectives, the
FCC preference is nonetheless impermissible. Irrespective of one's views
as to whether the Constitution prefers equal protection to free speech or
vice versa, 155 the FCC policy implicates these constitutional rights in
such different ways that equality must predominate in this case. The
elimination of the diversity preference merely limits FCC efforts to expand first-amendment values. Unlike prior restraints or direct regulation
of the press and broadcast media, the elimination of the diversity preference does not limit the speech of any speaker presently in the market152. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); see also CBS, Inc. v. FCC,
453 U.S. 367, 386 (1981) (upholding reasonable access regulations as applied to candidates for federal office); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-51 (1978) (upholding limitations on broadcasters' right to broadcast indecent material); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101-03 (1973) (noting the difficulty of balancing first-amendment interests in
broadcast media and the public's right to be informed). See generally Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEXAS L. REv. 207, 236-42 (1982); Wimmer, Deregula-

tion and the Market Failure in Minority Programming: The Socioeconomic Dimensions ofBroadcast
Reform, 8 CoMM./ENT. L.J. 329, 412-19 (1986).
153. Columbia Broadcasting, 412 U.S. at 102. The Court, moreover, has recognized that the
FCC has broad authority to interpret its public interest mandate. See National Broadeasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-16 (1943).
154. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3008.
155. The Constitution does not create a hierarchy of rights. Moreover, Professor Douglas Laycock's observation in a slightly different context-the clash between freedom of religion and equality-seems equally relevant here: "Even conceding that some constitutional rights may be more
important than others, both of these rights have been counted among our preferred freedoms." Laycock, Tax Exemptions for Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 60 TEXAS L. REv. 259, 262
(1982).
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place. In sharp contrast, the maintenance of the diversity preference
strikes at the heart of the Constitution's mandate for equal treatment on
the basis of race.
This conclusion is buttressed by Supreme Court holdings that equal
treatment values outweigh other constitutional protections. In Bob Jones
University v. United States, 156 the Court upheld the government's denial
of tax breaks to schools that, as a matter of religious belief, discriminate
on the basis of race. 157 For the Court, the government's "fundamental,
overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination . . . substantially
outweighs whatever burden" is placed on religious freedom.1 58 In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 159 the Court ruled that an all-male club's
freedom of association interest waned in comparison to state antidiscrimination efforts. 160 The Court observed that "acts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods, services, and
other advantages cause unique evils that government has a compelling
interest to prevent." 161 These cases make clear the primacy of the equal
treatment value.
The Metro Broadcasting Court, however, sidesteps the problems of
competing constitutional values by characterizing the diversity preference as benign. But if first-amendment diversity alone grounds the preference-that is, if equal protection remedial objectives are irrelevantthen the diversity preference is necessarily at odds with Brown v. Board
of Education's 162 universalistic command that racial line drawing is impermissible.163 Diversity, by itself, demands that government act in a
156. 461 u.s. 574 (1983).
157. /d. at 605.
158. /d. at 604; see also Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Examination
of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 19 COLUM. L. REv. 1514, 1549 (1979) (arguing that
only activities outside of a "spiritual epicenter" must yield to antidiscrimination policies). See generally Laycock, supra note 155, at 277 (arguing that there is no basis for rank ordering freedoms in the
Constitution). For further discussion of the balancing of religious liberty and antidiscrimination
values, see Marshall & Brant, Employment Discrimination in Religious Schools: A Constitutional
Analysis, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS 91 (N. Devins ed. 1989).
159. 468 u.s. 609 (1984).
160. See id. at 621.
161. /d. at 628. For further analysis, see Marshall, Discrimination and the Right ofAssociation,
81 Nw. U.L. REv. 68, 68-70 (1986) (arguing that the constitutionality of applying antidiscrimination legislation to private organizations is not settled by Roberts). The Roberts ruling was extended
in two subsequent cases pertaining to all-male clubs. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New
York, 487 U.S. 1, 12 (1988) (stating that under Roberts New York's Human Rights Law "could be
constitutionally applied at least to some of the large clubs''); Board of Directors v. Rotary Club, 481
U.S. 537, 546 (1987) (deelaring that "the relationship among Rotary Club members is not the kind
of intimate or private relation that warrants constitutional protection" from a state civil rights
statute).
162. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
163. For an excellent introduction to Brown's universalistic vision, see D. KIRP, JUST SCHOOLS
3-71 (1982).
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race-conscious manner and hence cannot be reconciled with the equality
guarantee. 164 Metro Broadcasting's failure to recognize competing equality concerns is the most disappointing feature of the case.
III. The Road Not Taken: The Remedial Justification for the FCC
Preference
The failings of Metro Broadcasting do not condemn FCC efforts to
increase minority ownership through racial preferences. The FCC program is capable of characterization as the permissible efforts of a federal
administrative agency to remedy societal discrimination. Although dutifully noting that "Congress found that 'the effects of past inequities stemming from racial and ethnic discrimination have resulted in a severe
underrepresentation of minorities in the media of mass communication,' "1 65 the Metro Broadcasting Court never pursued this line of inquiry. Perhaps, as shall shortly be discussed, 166 the FCC's handling of
the case forced the Court's hand on this point. Given the problematic
nature of Metro Broadcasting, however, the Court would have been better off upholding the diversity preference by pursuing this remedial tack.
The FCC preference is not merely an attempt to increase broadcast
diversity caused by the underrepresentation of minority license holders.
Two remedial justifications also underlie the FCC preferences. First, the
preference is an outgrowth of FCC efforts to further national equal employment opportunity objectives. Second, the preference is a remedial
link to FCC diversity objectives; since the underrepresentation of minority owners stems from societal discrimination, the FCC must remedy
that discrimination as a means to the end of program diversity.
The story begins in 1968 with the Kerner Commission Report concluding that America is a racially polarized society in need of pervasive
reform. 167 The Kerner Commission chided the broadcast media for failing to communicate "the difficulties and frustration of being a Negro in
the United States." 168 In response, the FCC adopted equal opportunity
regulations forbidding the grant of licenses to broadcasters who do not
comply with Title VII equal employment requirements as well as regulations requiring licensees to develop a comprehensive equal opportunity
164. For an analysis that reaches the opposite conclusion, see Comment, The Constitutionality of
the FCC's Use ofRace and Sex in the Granting ofBroadcast Licenses, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 665 (1989).
165. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3009-10 (1990) (quoting H.R. CoNF.
REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 43, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2261,
2287).
166. See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
167. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968).
168. /d. at 210.
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program. 169 The Commission claimed that its "duty" to serve the "public interest" included an obligation to further national civil rights policy
through its licensing decisions.t7o
At this time, however, the principle focus of FCC civil rights enforcement was the elimination of pernicious discrimination by its license
holders. Yet, within ten years the FCC would base the affirmative use of
race upon remedial concerns. 171
Similarly, in 1978, an FCC Task Force Report, Minority Ownership
in Broadcasting, 172 concluded that remedial assistance was an appropriate basis for increasing minority ownership. The Report observed:
Generations of discrimination have created a form of racial
caste.... [A] direct result of the general societal discrimination
has been the underrepresentation of these minorities in the ownership of broadcast stations . . . . [I]f the inequities of the past are to
be corrected they must be treated by measures which go beyond
mere "neutrality." 173
The Carter Administration echoed these concerns. In explaining
Administration recommendations that the FCC grant minority preferences, the President stated that the lack of minority ownership was attributable to:
Such obstacles as not having adequate financing, the lack of technical training because of discrimination and exclusion in the past,
and a shortage of available stations to buy or to manage, because so
many were assigned long ago when racial discrimination was both
a de facto and a de jure part of the American societallife.t 74
The FCC responded to the Carter initiative and their own task force recommendations with its May 1978 adoption of distress sale and tax certificate preferences for racial minorities.t 75
Congressional and related FCC action in the early 1980's further
169. Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination in
their Employment Practices, 13 F.C.C.2d 766 (1968) (Memorandum Opinion); Petition for
Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination in their Employment Practices, 18 F.C.C.2d 240 (1969) (Report and Order).
170. Petition for Rulemaking (Memorandum Opinion), 13 F.C.C.2d at 768, 769.
171. Remedial concerns were raised in the TV 91itigation. See Mid-Florida Television Corp., 37
F.C.C.2d 559, 560 (1972) (Hooks, Comm'r, concurring) (denial of rehearing) ("Blacks have been, for
so many years, oppressed by racist and artificial devices that it may take other 'artificial' measures to
offset the prevailing conditions.").
172. MINORITY OWNERSHIP TASKFORCE, FEDERAL CoMMUNICATIONS CoMM'N, MINORITY
OWNERSHIP IN BROADCASTING (1978); see also Note, Achieving Diversity in Media Ownership:
Bakke and the FCC, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 230, 233-36 (1979) (discussing racial discrimination against
minority broadcasters).
173. /d. at 7-8.
174. Telecommunication Minority Assistance Program, 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 1703, 1704 (Pres.
Carter).
175. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
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strengthens the remedial justification for the FCC preferences. Congress,
in 1981, enacted a lottery statute containing a diversity preference. After
the FCC refused to implement the statute, in part, because Congressunlike the Commission-did not specify that preference beneficiaries had
suffered from discrimination, Congress enacted a second lottery statute
in 1982. 176 This statute, which contained a racially specific diversity
preference, was responsive to the conferees' finding that ''the effects of
past inequities stemming from racial and ethnic discrimination have resulted in a severe underrepresentation of minorities in the media of mass
communications." 177
In 1986, however, the FCC flip-flopped, claiming that its diversity
preferences were constitutionally suspect because they were grounded
solely in diversity objectives. 178 This decision triggered congressional
hearings and, ultimately, limitation riders prohibiting FCC reexamination of its diversity preference. 179 The legislative history surrounding
this action suggests that Congress saw the FCC preferences as serving
remedial as well as diversity objectives.
However, prior to its filings before the Supreme Court, the FCC
maintained in Metro Broadcasting that its "goal in implementing the
preference policy has not been to remedy prior discrimination against
minorities or to provide remedial benefits." 180 With President Bush's appointment of three new commissioners in the summer of 1989 (all of
whom expressly supported the diversity preferences in their confirmation
176. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
177. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 43, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2261, 2287. The FCC formally referred to this remedial modification in a 1984
ruling. See In re Application of Faith Center, 99 F.C.C.2d 1164, 1171 (1984).
178. See Brief for Federal Communications Commission, Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (No. 84-1176), reprinted in Steele Hearings, supra note 104, at 78; supra notes 101-04 and
accompanying text. In saying the FCC "flip-flopped," I do not mean that the FCC's reexamination
of its diversity preferences was inappropriate. First, if the FCC viewed these preferences as purely a
diversity measure, there was reason to question their constitutionality. See supra notes 119-39 and
accompanying text. Second, even as a remedial link to diversity objectives, the FCC might well have
been troubled by its failure to examine whether there was in fact a correlation between minority
ownership and diverse programming. If no correlation was found to exist, the FCC might have
found itself without authority in this matter. Third, irrespective of the question of constitutionality,
the FCC may perceive race line drawing to be so odious as to be inconsistent with its public interest
mandate.
179. For example, in questioning FCC Chairman Mark Fowler, Congressman Mickey Leland
asked: "Why are you always putting up obstacles when we have some convenient means by which
we can overcome this incredible discrimination?" Steele Hearings, supra note 104, at 36. Another
example is Senate majority leader George Mitchell's statement that one need served by the FCC's
diversity preference "is to overcome 'the effects of ... discrimination.'" 136 CoNG. REc. S1775
(daily ed. Feb. 27, 1990); see supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text; see also S. REP. No. 182,
IOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 76, 77 (1988) (referring to Congress's remedial objectives).
180. Brieffor Federal Communications Commission, Winter Park Communications v. FCC, 873
F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (No. 85-1755).
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hearings 181), the FCC again changed course. Before the Supreme Court,
the FCC argued that the diversity preferences served "the compelling
governmental interests of promoting diversity in broadcast programming
and remedying discrimination."1s2
It seems entirely appropriate that the FCC frame its Supreme Court
argument this way. The demand that an agency "explain the rationale
and factual basis for its decision" 183 and the prohibition of post hoc rationalizations of agency policy before a reviewing court184 does not foreclose FCC advancement of this remedial justification. The remedial
justification falls well within Supreme Court precedent "uphold[ing] a
decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be
discemed." 185 First, the establishment and evolution of FCC diversity
preferences suggests that remedial concerns played a large role. Second,
FCC fact finding explicitly supports the remedial connection. Third,
since the FCC preference is responsive to the adverse consequences of
minority underrepresentation on broadcast diversity, the causes of minority nnderrepresentation (various aspects of societal discrimination)
are inexorably linked to program diversity concerns. Fourth, a contrary
holding demands that government agencies undertake the seemingly redundant task of re-authorizing existing regulations. Such a requirement
seems clearly impractical, as well as a violation of the rights of government agencies to define their own policy agenda. 186
181. See Nominations--July: Hearings Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 341 (1989) (statement of Alfred C. Sikes); id. at 365
(statement of Andrew Barrett); id. at 380 (statement of Sherrie Marshall).
182. Brief for Federal Communications Commission at 27, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453).
183. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 (1986); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n v. State Farm Mnt. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (requiring explanation and justification of Department of Defense policies).
184. See FPC v. Texaco, 417 U.S. 380, 397 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp. 332 U.S. 194, 196-97
(1947). See generally C. KocH, ADMINISrRATIVE LAW AND PRACriCE § 8.45, at 61-62 (1985).
185. Bowman Transp. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281,286 (1974); accord Sears Sav.
Bank v. FSLIC, 775 F.2d 1028, 1029 (9th Cir. 1985); Consolidated Gas Transmission Corp. v.
FERC, n1 F.2d 1536, 1550 n.18 (D.C Cir. 1985). See generally C. KocH, supra note 184, at§ 9.13
(1990 Supp.).
186. See generally Rabkin & Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decree: Constitutional
Limits of Settlements with the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REv. 203, 240-41 (1987) (arguing
that one administration cannot limit its successor's inherent policy-making discretion through consent decrees); Shapiro & Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation ofPoY.-ers and
the Requirement ofAdequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 436 (discussing the
justification for, and proper level of, judicial review of administrative agencies).
It also seems a little too late in the day to argue-as the Bush Department of Justice did in
Metro Broadcasting-that the deference accorded Congress's efforts to combat discrimination do not
extend to "federal administrative agencies acting under a general grant of authority to regulate a
particular indnstry in the public interest." Brief for the United States at 14, Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453). Congress, for better or worse, is empowered to
broadly delegate its rule-making authority to executive and independent agencies. See generally L.
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The Court in Metro Broadcasting, of course, declined to assess the
remedial justification for the diversity preference. That refusal, in large
measure, can be attributed to the FCC's handling of the case. Rather
than argue that the FCC itself intends for its diversity preferences to
serve remedial objectives, the FCC brief argues that congressional action-presumably the limitation riders-has superimposed remedial
objectives onto the FCC preference. 187 While the limitation riders temporarily freeze the preferences, it is quite a stretch to argue that they alter
the substantive objectives served by the preferences. 18S
The Court's refusal to treat the FCC preference as a remedial measure is appropriate. Unlike social and economic legislation for which the
Court is free to provide legitimating ends, 189 racial line drawing at least
demands that the government clearly state the purposes behind its action.190 The FCC's effort to tie its remedial theory to congressional action simply does not wash. To hold otherwise-that is, to empower
courts to provide legitimating rationales when government's use of race
is well intentioned-is to tear at the heart of equality. Separation of
functions and antidiscrimination set line drawing on the basis of race
apart from other governmental conduct for a reason.
All of this leads to a somewhat strange conclusion. The FCC preference is capable of characterization as a remedy for societal discrimination. Moreover, since this remedy is integrally related to the FCC's
interest in program diversity, the preference lies within the bounds of
FCC authority. Consequently, there is good reason to uphold the preference. However, as it is incumbent upon the FCC to state the basis for its
use of race, its failure to endorse the remedial justification as its own
forecloses remedial analysis. Moreover, the diversity justification by itself is inadequate support for governmental line drawing on the basis of
race. The FCC plan therefore must be declared invalid.
This conclusion may appear to be the victory of form over substance. After all, the FCC need only point to its and Congress's fmdings
about the causes of minority underrepresentation and the impact of such
TluBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 5-17, at 362-69 (2d eel. 1988). A remedial diversity

preference easily falls within FCC jurisdiction, for it is a necessary link to the FCC's clear interest in
broadeast diversity.
187. Brieffor Federal Co=unications Commission at 32-35, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453).
188. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) ("Evils in the same field
may be of different dimensions ... [o]r so the legislature may think.") (emphasis added); Railway
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (''The local authorities may well have concluded [that the regulation advanced a nseful purpose].") (emphasis added).
190. Congress's lottery statute meets this mandate and hence is clearly constitutional under the
analysis advanced in this Co=ent.

154
HeinOnline -- 69 Tex. L. Rev. 154 1990-1991

Requiem for a Heavyweight
underrepresentation on program diversity objectives to justify the diversity preference. In my view, however, the costs of racial line drawing
demand this formality. Government's use of race either to define an individual's worth or as a behavioral predictor is one of the principal evils
to be checked by the counter-majoritarian judiciary. The mandate that
government forthrightly defend its use of race therefore seems an absolutely minimalist demand.
IV.

Conclusion

Metro Broadcasting is at once far reaching and vulnerable: far
reaching because the utilization of middle tier review and the approval of
nonremedial affirmative action is suggestive of expansive congressional
authority to utilize race-specific preferences; vulnerable because the demands of middle tier review may prove as scrutinizing as strict review, 19 1
and because the line drawn between Congress and other governmental
entities may ultimately limit the case to instances where race preferences
are formally endorsed in authorizing legislation. In the hands of a Court
without Justice William Brennan, there is reason to think that the case
will receive a narrowing construction. Nonetheless, although a narrowing construction may effectively nullify the case's most controversial features, Metro Broadcasting at the least reinforces Fullilove and thereby
provides a significant victory for proponents of race preferences.
But this victory may not prove sweet. As this Comment demonstrates, Metro Broadcasting reflects suspect reasoning and is an affront to
core equality values. For the powerful critics of Justice Brennan, this
case may well prove a model of judicial impropriety. At this level, Metro
Broadcasting diverts attention away from the very real problems minorities face as a consequence of past discrimination. This result is tragic.
There is another tragedy here. Metro Broadcasting, by emphasizing
the deference owed Congress as well as the Court's "confidence" in the
judiciary's ability to distinguish well-intentioned from pernicious classifications, 192 seems almost flip in its approval of race preferences. This
"What, me worry?" approach invites Congress to treat race-like farm
supports, trade tariffs, defense systems, and so on-as simply another
bargaining chip in the legislative process. Race is different, however, and
191. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (rejecting-as inconsistent with "the
normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause"-state proof that gender classification concerning the sale of alcohol is warranted because men are eleven times more likely than
women to be arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol).
192. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3008 n.l2 (1990). For further discussion, see supra note 126.
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the unthinking use of race is simply unacceptable. As Professor Drew
Days, who represented the United States in Fullilove, observed in arelated context: "This is an indefensible state of affairs that threatens to
undermine the principle of affirmative action and the appropriate use of
race-conscious remedies for racial discrimination. It ought to stop." 193
Metro Broadcasting's significance as a precedent and a symbol is a
story that has yet to unfold. By choosing the broadest grounds available
for their decision, however, the Supreme Court may have ultimately limited the constructive use of race preferences. In any event, by suggesting
that the trouble with racial classifications is merely a problem of ends
and not means, Metro Broadcasting sends the wrong message.
193. Days, supra note 49, at 485.
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